The internet is awash not only with instructions from digital security experts, but also with urban legends and conspiracy theories that divert attention away from the real dangers of Max.
David Frenkel
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Central Asia’s digital ambitions are achievable, but only if policy is aligned with the region’s physical constraints.
As they position themselves as a digital hub linking Europe and Asia, Central Asia’s countries are seeking to attract global technology investment through regulatory sandboxes, tax incentives, and innovation zones. Kazakhstan is developing an AI ecosystem around alem.ai and building a Data Center Valley, Uzbekistan is launching a hyperscale data center development zone in Karakalpakstan, and Tajikistan has launched the Area AI special zone.
Yet digital ambitions alone do not create digital infrastructure. Whether Central Asia can translate these initiatives into a functioning hub depends on how the region navigates the three Ps of digital development: power, pathways, and policy. Digital economies run on electricity and move through connectivity pathways, while policy shapes investment incentives and market formation. Where electricity systems remain strained and connectivity pathways limited, overly restrictive regulation can slow market development. The principal challenge for Central Asia is not whether to regulate, but how to align regulatory ambition with the region’s physical constraints.
Reliable and affordable electricity is foundational to digital development. Data centers powering cloud services and AI are highly energy-intensive. Yet Central Asia’s data center capacity remains limited. As of 2025, the combined data center capacity of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan amounts to just over 4,700 racks: below what would be needed to support large-scale digital ambitions. Reliability is limited, too: only fifteen data centers hold Tier III certification from the Uptime Institute, and just one meets active operation standards.
Global investors are responding to this gap. In Uzbekistan, DataVolt has committed over 4.6 billion euros to green data centers by 2030. Chinese firms are also investing, including Shanghai LinkWise’s $3.5 billion GPU-powered computing center in Karakalpakstan, and Inspur Yunzhou’s big-data project in Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan, Singapore’s GK Hyperscale Ltd. is planning a $1.5 billion investment to build 200 megawatts (MW) of capacity.
If investment accelerates, however, the region’s electricity systems will determine whether these projects can operate reliably at scale. Much of the region’s generation and distribution infrastructure is experiencing increasing wear, efficiency losses, and capacity constraints. Governments are attempting to address these through large-scale modernization and expansion initiatives. Kazakhstan plans to add roughly 26 gigawatts (GW) of new generation capacity by 2035. Uzbekistan plans to more than double its installed capacity to 59 GW while constructing around 9,000 kilometers of new transmission lines.
In the meantime, demand for digital infrastructure is expected to increase. Some estimates suggest Kazakhstan’s data centers alone will demand 1 GW by 2030, while Uzbekistan’s are projected to consume 9 billion kilowatt-hours by 2035.
The Akashi Data Center in Kazakhstan illustrates the structural challenge. Designed as the region’s pioneer Tier IV facility with 100 MW capacity, the facility is over 60 percent prebooked. Yet its reliability requirements exceed what the existing grid can guarantee. The operator is considering building a dedicated power plant with a capacity of up to 1 GW to secure energy independence. While hybrid energy arrangements are common globally, uneven grid reliability shifts system-level risk onto private investors, imposing an “infrastructure tax” on digital investment.
Just as they depend on kilowatts, digital economies rely on connectivity infrastructure: fiber backbones, cross-border links, and redundant routes. Lacking direct access to submarine cables that carry almost all of the world’s internet traffic, Central Asia relies on terrestrial routes that amplify vulnerability.
Internal connectivity reveals the first layer of this constraint. Kazakhstan functions as the regional backbone with an estimated 40,000 kilometers of operational fiber. Yet the country’s vast territory and low population density mean that network access remains uneven: only about a third of the population lives within 10 kilometers of a fiber node. Other Central Asian countries operate smaller but denser networks. In Tajikistan, about 97 percent of residents live within 50 kilometers of a node. However, physical proximity does not guarantee resilience. Without redundant routes and diversified interconnection points, even dense networks are vulnerable to single points of failure.
Network interconnection reveals deeper structural weaknesses. Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) show whether domestic networks exchange traffic locally or rely on international transit. In Uzbekistan, only 22 percent of autonomous systems participate in local peering, with a significant share of domestic traffic routing abroad. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan report higher domestic peering ratios, exceeding 80 percent, but this reflects the small scale of their markets rather than robustness.
Tajikistan, for example, depends on a single exchange with fewer than ten active members, creating a potential single point of failure. Even in Kazakhstan, interconnection is geographically concentrated. Although the country hosts 196 registered autonomous systems, active IXPs operate in only one major population center (with over 300,000 residents), forcing traffic from other cities to route through a central hub.
External connectivity compounds these challenges. Most Central Asian traffic transits Russia, rendering digital connectivity dependent on Russia’s infrastructure providers. Kazakhstan maintains approximately seventeen fiber-optic lines with Russia, compared to two with China and five with its Central Asian neighbors. Roughly 95 percent of Kazakhstan’s web traffic transits Russian networks, and Kazakh internet service providers source approximately 80 percent of their international bandwidth from Russian operators. This dependency cascades downstream to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
For global hyperscalers, this lack of geographical redundancy is a bottleneck. Without multiple, physically distinct routes that bypass the northern vector, the region remains a high-risk environment for the capital-intensive infrastructure required to establish large digital hubs.
Efforts to diversify are under way. The 380-kilometer Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable via Azerbaijan aims to link Central Asia and Europe as part of the Digital Silk Road. Scheduled for completion by late 2026, this project with transmission capacity of up to 400 terabits per second could significantly reduce reliance on northern routes.
If power and connectivity pathways provide the hardware of the digital economy, the third P—policy—functions as the operating system. Where physical constraints remain, policy can enable access to external digital infrastructure. This logic underpins widely adopted “Cloud-First” or “Cloud-Smart” strategies, wherein governments prioritize global cloud solutions while local infrastructure develops. In emerging digital hubs such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, cloud-friendly policies have helped attract global hyperscalers (Google, AWS, and Microsoft Azure) and the capital-intensive infrastructure they bring.
Across Central Asia, governments are modernizing digital legislation, including Kazakhstan’s Digital Code and AI Law, as well as Kyrgyzstan’s pioneering Digital Code. These reflect legitimate efforts to strengthen digital governance. However, a key challenge lies in sequencing: distinguishing between market-building policies, which enable infrastructure and investment, and market-governing regulations, which manage risks once markets are established.
Data localization illustrates this tension. While not unique to Central Asia, such policies reflect legitimate concerns about data sovereignty and security, particularly for sensitive government or critical infrastructure information. Yet broad localization mandates introduced before reliable power and redundant connectivity exist can impose a regulatory “entry fee.” This discourages hyperscalers from deploying cloud zones and edge infrastructure and slows digital adoption. While hyperscale cloud providers have launched in over 200 regions worldwide, none currently operate in Central Asia, highlighting how regulatory design can influence investment in infrastructure-constrained environments.
The lesson is not deregulation, but careful sequencing. In infrastructure-constrained environments, digital policy is effective when it does not rely on heavy upfront restrictions but post-implementation oversight, allowing investment to flow while preserving the state’s ability to intervene as risks emerge. Aligning regulation with infrastructure realities is critical for Central Asia. By prioritizing market-enabling frameworks, governments can accelerate investment needed to build the power systems, diversify connectivity pathways, and shape the physical and regulatory foundations of a sustainable digital hub.
Aruzhan Meirkhanova
Senior Researcher at the Center for Regional Analysis at the National Analytical Center
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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